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A 
l?Dilpoint 
Report 
T h  is a midpoint progress report of 
the Reporter on current prop& to 
amend the class action rule, Rule 23 of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In 
part, it is one of many calls for help. 
The proposed amendments have been 
published for comment. It is important 
that the rulemakers hear from as many 
interested observers as possible. One of 
the pitfalls of the comment process - at 
least one of the pitfalls that the 
rulemakers like to believe in - is that 
there are many observers who believe 
that the rulemakers have got it right, and 
do not need to be told that they have got 
it right. The record of comments may 
make proposals seem more controversial, 
or less well advised, than they are. And in 
other part, this report is an illustrati06of 
the care that is taken in the largely 
invisible process that continually reviews, 
and periodically amends, the rules. 
The rulemaking process is wily 
sketched from the bottom up. The 
process begins in the committee structure 
of the Judicial Conference of the United 
ote q o r t s  on the Advisory 
Committed cum work on the clms 
actiorr rule, Civil Rule 23. The m-ng 
process has becme the Wrt 3 
attention in *cent yams, mul it 
is hoped that this npoh will stimlute 
additional interest aful rrrpnrta. 
States. First-line responsibility falk on 
the Advisory Committee on the Federal ' 
Rules of Civil Procedure. The Advisory 
Committee reports to the "Sta&ng2' 
Committee on Rules of Practice and 
Procedure. Amendments tentatively, ,, 
endorsed by the Standmg C o d t t e e  
am published for comment and public 
hearings. After publication, the Advisory 
Committee reviews all of the written 
comments and oral testiinony and again 
reports to the Standrig Committee. If 
substantial changeshave been made, a 
proposal may require a second period of 
publication and public comment. When 
a proposal is ready to proceed funher, 
the Standing Committee recommends 
approval by the Judicial Conference, a 
group of more than two dozen federal 
judges chaired by the Chief Justice. If 
the Judicial Conference approves, it 
transmits the proposal to the Supreme 
Court. The Supreme Court bears 
ultimate responsibility for adopting the 
rules and revising them. Once the 
Supreme Court has approved a revision, 
it sends the revision to Congress. 
Revisions adopted by the Supreme 
Court become effective unless Congress 
acts to disapprove them. 
Rule 23 was extensively amended in 
1966. The amendments created a new 
"common question" class action under 
RuIe 23(b)(3). (b)(3) class actions were 
designed to facilitate enforcement of 
claims too small to bear the cost of 
inhvidual litigation. This new 
device has taken on a role far beyond 
the dreams of its creators, enhancing the 
actual effect of many substantive 
provisions. In the last few years, it has 
been pressed to serve in quite a different 
setting as one of the many alternative 
strategies used m the effor~ to manage 
vast numbers of related actlons Asbesios 
lliigation promdes the most famlliar 
I example, but other examples are almost 
as famillar Attempts to w n  class 
j certification have met w t h  m ~ e d  success 
m dealing wlth such problems as sllicone 
gel breast ~mplants, agarettes, sidesaddle 
pickup trucks, and heart valves 
The dramatic growth of (b)(3) class 
actions generated lively debate For more 
than two decades, however, a taut 
moratorium on Rule 23 proposals was 
observed by the Clml Rules Advlsory 
Commlttee The process of shaplng 
Rule 23 into a worklng and reasonably 
famillar procedure was left to the creatlve 
efforts of the bar and the wsdom of the 
bench In 199 1, however, the report of an 
ad hoc Judlclal Conference committee on 
asbestos litlgat~on led the Judlc~al 
Conference to recommend that the 
Standlng Commlttee and Advlsory 
Commlttee study Rule 23 The Advlsory 
Committee has been working on this 
chore ever since 
The first effort of the Admsory 
Committee was based m large part on 
proposals made by an Amencan Bar 
Association committee several years ago 
As refined by the Admsory Committee, 
then chaired by Chlef Judge Sam C 
Pointer, Jr , of the Northern Distnct of 
Alabama, this draft would have made 
many changes None of the changes was 
fundamental, and even together they 
.\vould not have been revolutionary 
Rule 23 would have been restructured 
This proposal softened the long-familiar 
categoncal distinctions between 
mconsistent-obligation and limited-fund 
(b)(l), injunction (b)(2), and "common 
question" (b)(3) classes The softening 
was designed in large part to senre other 
goals, strengthening notlce requirements 
lor some actlons but reducing them for 
others, expanding but also contracting 
opportunltles to opt out, creatlng new 
opt-m classes, and so on These proposals 
were remewed by extenswe groups of 
academics, lawyers, and judges There 
was wdespread agreemenL that they were 
relatlveiy modest But the lawyers m 
particular were concerned that the main 
effect would be to create at least a decade 
of uncertainty while they collectively 
worked to instruct judges on proper use 
of the new rule. 
The questions raised by these reactions 
suggested to the Advisory Committee that 
it must undertake a broader inquiry The 
central question was whether the time 
had come to propose any amendments 
whatever. Faced with a lack of helpful 
empirical data, the Advisory Committee 
enlisted the help of the researchers at the 
Federal Judicial Center (FJC). The FJC 
study set out to address a series of 
questions raised by widespread anecdotal 
observations about class actions by 
reviewing the files of all class actions 
concluded during a two-year period in 
four of the busiest class-action districts. 
The first lesson was that class actions 
have been dramatically undercounted. 
Each of the four districts had at least 
twice as many class-action filings as had 
been reported. Other lessons were more 
complex, and always subject to the 
qualifications that attach to any study 
based on a sample, even one carefully 
chosen. The Advisory Committee - 
now chaired by Judge Patrick E. 
Higgnbotham of the Fifth Circuit - also 
reached out for the views of academics, 
lawyers, and judges with rich personal 
experience in class litigation. Lawyers 
were invited to address the Advisory 
Committee at its regular meetings. The 
Committee met in conjunction with, or 
attended, class-action symposia at law 
schools in Dallas, New York, Philadelpha, 
and Tuscaloosa. Experienced class-action 
practitioners also were invited to attend 
committee meetings, and contributed 
valuable suggestions. Two veterans of the 
1966 amendment process, John P Frank 
of the PhoenLx Bar and Professor Arthur 
R. Miller of Harvard Law School, were 
actively involved in these efforts. 
With all of these activities, the 
Advisory Con~n~ittee moved to the top of 
several hlls (none was really a mountain). 
It stayed on some, and moved back down 
from others. It has won Standing 
Committee approval to publish several 
amendments for public comment in the 
form submitted to the Standing 
Committee. The Standing Committee 
made it clear, however, that it was 
approving publication as the next logical 
step in a process that still must include 
careful reconsideration of each item in 
the proposal. 
So what is proposed, and what 
earnestly considered proposals were put 
aside? 
One proposal would create a 
permissive interlocutory procedure that 
would establish court of appeals 
discretion to permit appeal from an order 
granting or refusing class certification. 
Both judges and lawyers commonly greet 
this proposal with ~Izepticism, fearing that 
bootless attempts to appeal will be made 
in virtually every class action. And, just as 
commonly, they have come to agree that 
the courts of appeals should be able to 
manage this procedure as an improve- 
ment on the unsatisfactory alternatives 
now available. Appellate judges in 
particular believe that experience with the 
similar permissive appeal provisions of 
28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) shows that the new 
appeal procedure can be controlled with 
little burden or delay 
The other proposals that should 
command general interest focus on (b)(3) 
common-question classes. Changes are 
made in the list of enumerated factors 
that bear on the determination whether 
common questions "predominate" and 
whether a (b)(3) class is superior to other 
means of adjudication. These changes 
focus on both ends of the spectrum 
defined by the size of individual class- 
member claims. In a variety of ways, the 
factors are revised to encourage care in 
certifying classes that include many 
members whose claims would support 
individual litigation. Although class 
certification of mass tort cases is not 
prohibited, these changes reflect concern 
that in some situations class actions are 
less desirable than individual litigation or 
aggregation by some means other than a 
single large class. 
At the other end of the spectrum lie 
claims that promise to retuln only 
minuscule recoveries to individual class 
members. A new factor (F) would be 
added, permitting the court to consider 
"whether the probable relief to individual 
class members justifies the costs and 
burdens of class litigation." This provision 
has become know11 in the vernacular as 
the "just ain't worth it" provision. It is 
bound to be controversial. To some, it 
will seem a retreat from the great strides 
made by (b)(3) toward enforcing 
important social policies that are 
imperfectly fulfilled by public enforcement. 
The point of class actions, on this view, is 
not only to secure individual redress but 
also to take the profit out of violating the 
law. The proposal takes a rather different 
view, founded in the belief that private 
litigation is an imperfect means of 
enforcing public values. Adversary 
litigation as we know it is cumbersome 
and expensive. Often it is called upon to 
enforce the uncertain commands of 
obscure statutory or other policies that 
may be violated despite diligent and 
sincere efforts to comply The costs and 
risks of this enforcement are justified by 
the prospect of meaningful individual 
relief. If there is no prospect of 
meaningful individual relief, and no one 
but the class lawyers stands to benefit, 
the costs and burdens of class litigation 
may not be justified. 
(An attractive alternative to refusal to 
certify a class may be to provide for relief 
that need not incur the frequently 
I crippling expenses of administering 
individual distribution. "Fluid" class 
recovery may provide attractive means of 
substitute relief. Rather than distribute a 
dollar of damages to each individual 
consumer injured by a short-lived 
pricefixing conspiracy, the defendants 
1 could be ordered to reduce prices as a 
way of compensating present consumers 
~ 
without bothering to address the 
discontinuities between past and present 
consumers. The Advisory Committee 
concluded that such alternatives should 
be put aside because they raise serious 
questions under the Rules Enabling Act , requirement that the rules not abridge, 
modify, or enlarge any substantive right.) 
Another new item in the list of (b)(3) 
factors is the "maturity" of the class claim, 
1 issue, or defense. This factor addresses 
glaring gaps in factual knowledge. Claims 
that a product causes an injury, for 
example, may rest on very uncertain 
science. Experience with individual 
litigation of related issues may show that 
courts regularly reach inconsistent results. 
In either setting, it may be unwise to risk 
all claims on a single throw of the class 
action die. 
A final important (b)(3) provision is 
proposed by adding a new paragraph 
(b)(4). Ths  proposal would permit 
certification of a (b)(3) class for purposes 
of settlement only, even though the court 
would not certify the same class for 
litigation purposes. Settlement classes 
have evolved gradually over the years, 
but recent Third Circuit decisions have 
adopted the limit that a class may be 
certified for settlement purposes only if 
the same class would be certified for 
litigation. The proposal draws from the 
belief that settlement classes may prove 
useful in addressing a variety of problems 
that cannot be resolved by litigation 
classes. Choice-of-law problems offer one 
clear example. Application of different 
state laws to dispersed events may defeat 
class-based litigation of some claims 
because common questions no longer 
predominate. Settlements can be achieved 
that bypass these problems, and that 
provide the additional advantage of 
achieving similar treatment for people 
suffering similar injuries. Manageability 
problems offer another example. A single 
court may be hard-pressed to resolve 
litigation that embraces not only common 
class issues but also the individual issues 
that must be resolved as LO each class 
member. Settlement can bypass these 
problems too, at times by providing 
alternative means of resolving individual 
disputes under the cour~3 aegis but 
without making impossible demands on 
the court. 
Tlie decision to address (b)(3) settle- 
ment classes through a new paragraph 
(b)(4) has already generated a modest 
drafting controversy. Paragraph (b)(4) 
would allow "certification under 
subdivision (b)(3) for purposes of 
settlement." Following drafting guidelines 
created for the Standing Committee by 
Bryan Garner, author of A Dictiol~aty of 
Modem Legal Usage, "under" is used in 
place of the familiar but ungainly 
"pursuant to." The explicit intention of 
the Advisory Committee is that a class 
authorized by (b)(4) is a (b)(3) class. 
As a (b)(3) class, it must satisfy all of the 
prerequisites of subdivision (a) and also 
must satisfy all of the (b)(3) requirements. 
In addition, it carries the usual 
consequences of all ib)(3) classes, 
including the specific (b)(3) notice 
requirements and the right to request 
exclusion from the class. Many observers, 
however, have supposed that the (bY.4) 
class is a new entity, CUL adrift from 
any of these requirements. This reaction 
is cause at once for chagrin and 
reconsideration. More words can be used 
to convey the same thought. It will be 
interesting to see whether [here is such 
general concern that the drafting must 
be revised. 
This description of the changes 
proposed for public comment leaves 
aside other changes that were carefully 
pursued to the final step before 
recommending publication. Two deserve 
specific comment. 
Preliminary consideration of the merits 
was one change that rose to win great 
favor, met doubts, and then died. There is 
great concern that class actions may be 
brought on insubstantial claims, just one 
step beyond the level that can win 
precertification dismissal by motion for 
failure to state a claim or for summary 
judgment. Part way through the Advisory 
Committee's deliberations, it was 
suggested that the rule should be 
amended to reject the Supreme Court 
ruling that the merits of the claim must 
not be considered in ruling on class 
certification. Much comfort was drawn 
from the imperfect analogy to the 
tentative evaluation of the merits made ill 
At the other end of the spectrum lie claims that promise to return only 
minuscule recoveries to individual class members. A new factor (F) 
would be added, permitting the court to consider "whether the 
probable relief to individual class members justifies the costs and 
burdens of class litigation." This provision has become known in the 
vernacular as the "just ain't worth it" provision. 
i m 
mllng on preliminary injunctions. 
Alternative drafts were prepared. One set 
a low threshold, requiring only that the 
class claims, issues, or defenses be "not 
insubstantial on the merits." The other set 
a higher threshold, invoking a balancing 
process that weighed the prospect of class 
success against the costs and burdens 
imposed by certification. To the surprise 
of a11 concerned, the defense lawyers who 
initially championed this proposal had 
second thoughts. Consideration of the 
merits even in a tentative fashion would 
justify substantial discovery on the merits 
before the certification decision. Worse, a 
finding that a sufficient showing had been 
made could affect all subsequent events, 
particularly the settlement process that 
resolves most class actions just as it 
resolves most other litigation. These 
concerns were not assuaged by adding 
the qualification that the merits need be 
considered only at the request of a party 
opposing class certification. Despite some 
lingering regrets, this proposal was 
abandoned. 
The other near miss was part of the 
"just ain't worth it" proposal. In addition 
to consideration of the probable relief to 
individual class members, interim drafts 
provided for weighing the public interest 
in class relief against the costs and 
burdens of class litigation. This language 
was meant to confirm the importance of 
enforcing small claims that, in the 
aggregate, represent significant public 
enforcement values. In the end, however, 
it was feared that explicit reference to the 
public interest might seem to invite 
judicial evaluation of the relative 
importance of different substantive 
policies. Different judges will assess 
differently the benefits of enforcing any of 
the many modem regulatory statutes. 
Rather than encourage such substantive 
distinctions, it was thought better to 
assume an unvarying public interest in 
enforcing any valid statutory or 
commonlaw policy. This approach has 
manifest attractions. At the same time, it 
may encourage sweeping enforcement 
against technical violations of ambiguous 
meaning, committed by persons who 
diligently sought to comply. Some will 
regret the passing of this proposal. 
Much activity will occur before any 
final action on the Rule 23 proposals. 
Much hard work will be done, most of it 
by lawyers and judges who voluntarily 
assume the burdens of responsible 
participation in the public comment 
process. All of the proposals that have 
been advanced, and many of those that 
have been put aside, will be carefully 
reconsidered. 
Evidence that the outcome of the Rule 
23 proposals is not settled by the decision 
to publish can be found in many earlier 
experiences. Many proposals have been 
advanced and then substantially changed, 
deferred, or abandoned. Recent history 
provides examples enough. In 1995, the 
Committee published four proposals. 
One was beyond controversy probably 
because it affected a comer of 
interlocutory admiralty appeal practice 
that affects few litigants or l aye r s .  A 
second seeks to restore the 12-member 
civil jury; this proposal has been 
recommended for approval by the 
Standing Committee to the Judicial 
Conference, but remains controversial 
because 12-member juries cost more than 
6-member juries. A third, advanced in 
tandem with a parallel change in the 
Criminal Rules, sought to ensure attorney 
participation in voir dire examination of 
prospective jurors. The comments and 
hearings on this proposal showed a wide 
difference between the perceptions of 
lawyers and judges. La~vyers believe that 
many judges conduct inadequate voir 
dire examinations, while many judges 
believe that l a y e r s  will deliberately 
subvert the process in search of adversary 
advantage. The Advisory Committee 
concluded that it would be unwise to 
attempt reconciliation through present 
n ~ l e  changes. Instead, efforts will be 
directed toward mutual education of 
bench and bar in the hope that the 
present rule can be made to work better. 
A majority of federal judges now permit 
direct lawyer voir dire examination, and 
believe that it is effective so long as there is 
unquestioned authority to terminate or 
withhold the opportunity If more come to 
permit lawyer participation, the present rule 
may prove better than the proposed 
alternative. Fourth and finally, a revised 
proposal to amend the pro~lsions for 
discovery protective orders was republished. 
The comment process left the Ad\+m-y 
Committee uncertain whether any change is 
needed. More important, the Committee has 
decided to turn its attention again to the 
broader discovery questions that have been 
on - or close to - the Committee agenda 
without interruption for three decades. 
Should significant changes be made in the 
broad scheme of discoveer)! protective orders 
may be affected in ways that cannot be 
accommodated by present drafting. 
Public comment taught much about these 
recent proposals. It will teach much about 
the current Rule 23 proposals. The broader 
the base of participation, the better the 
process nil1 work. No more able group of 
commentators can be found than the readers 
of Lnlv Quadrangle Notes. Your comments 
should be addressed to Peter G. McCabe, 
Secretary, Committee on Rules of Practice 
and Procedure, Judicial Conference of the 
United States, \Vashington. D.C. 20544. 
m 
Edward H .  Cooper, Tltomas M.  Coolqv Professor 
of Law, speciali;cs in thefields qffederal p?ncedurc 
aitd j~irisdiction and is cn-author q f  a leading treatise 
on fedci-al jurisdiction and procedure. A graduate 
of Daitmouth College and Harvard Law School, 
he has taught at Michigan sincc 1972. 
enactments at the farthest reach of ' 
